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Abstract  
This chapter describes obstacles to financing mitigation in smallholder agricultural systems, 
and provides recommendations to overcome these; it also emphasizes how smallholder 
agricultural finances overlaps with carbon finance. Analysis and recommendations are based 
on literature reviews and the author’s experience. Descriptions of obstacles to financing both 
smallholder carbon credit projects and agricultural projects involving smallholders are given. 
Overlapping barriers are: ability to manage risks, access to inputs, aggregation, best practices 
and capacity and tenure, property rights and enforcement. The conclusion is that existing 
agricultural investment barriers are fundamental to the livelihoods of many, and go far beyond 
carbon finance issues, although significant overlap is acknowledged. By tackling these 
barriers, it may be possible to unlock some of the potential mitigation from agriculture. Vice-
versa, ‘fit-for-purpose’ carbon finance for mitigation could help to overcome some existing 
barriers faced by smallholders. The paper provides recommendations to a variety of 
stakeholders on how they could help design fit-for-purpose carbon finance. 
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 Introduction 
This chapter describes obstacles to financing mitigation in smallholder agricultural systems1, 
and provides recommendations to overcome these. The emphasis is on smallholder 
agricultural finance and overlaps with carbon finance, rather than specific carbon finance 
issues. It is structured as follows: first, characteristics of carbon finance in the context of 
agriculture, forestry and other land uses (AFOLU) are summarized; second, the characteristics 
of smallholder agricultural finance are described; third, the overlaps between obstacles to 
carbon and agricultural finance are discussed; fourth conclusions are drawn.   
 
 
1 Smallholders are defined as commercial and subsistence-oriented farmers, managing less than 5 hectares of land 
Carbon finance in the context of smallholder AFOLU 
practices  
Smallholders can generate carbon credits through energy and land use (LU) practices. This 
chapter focuses on LU practices, summarized in Table 1. 
Net increases in mitigation attributable to improved practices, compared to usual practices, 
are used to estimate carbon credit volumes. Credits must be quantified and independently 
verified according to a chosen carbon credit standard and a methodology under that standard. 
Although sales of carbon credits could be a valuable addition to smallholder incomes, a 
number of barriers have prevented this. 
One barrier has been a lack of accepted standards with methodologies to quantify mitigation 
from agricultural practices, illustrated by Table 1. The lack of methodologies to credit 
increases in soil carbon is, however, currently being addressed. The Vi Project in Kenya is 
working with the World Bank to develop a Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) methodology to 
credit increases in both above and below ground carbon stocks.2 
Other barriers to both energy and LU agricultural mitigation projects involving smallholders 
include:  
• Small size of benefit per smallholder: projects require significant spatial scale to be 
economically viable, given the transaction costs of monitoring, measuring mitigation 
achieved. 
• The informational complexity faced by the smallholder during the carbon credit 
registration and issuance processes.  
• The sizeable up-front cost of project development. . 
• Uncertainty of cash flow ex-ante; Projects using a voluntary carbon standard can be 
difficult to value, as Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCMs) are relatively un-transparent 
and illiquid.   
 
 
2 More information about this can be found on the Vi and World Bank websites, and at the following web link (last accessed 8 February 2011): 
http://www.agriculture4development.se/document/56_100_Wakesa%20-%20Western%20Kenya%20smallholder%20agriculture%20carbon%20project.pdf 
 Table 1 Mitigation options for Agriculture3 
Farm Practice Carbon 
credits 
Applicable 
standard 
Farm Practice Carbon 
credits 
Applicable 
standard 
Crop rotations and farming systems design Nutrient and manure management 
Improve crop varieties X N/A Improve nitrogen (N) use 
efficiency 
X N/A 
Feature perennials in crop 
rotations 
L CDM A/R, 
VCS, Plan 
Vivo 
Adjust fertilizer application to 
crop needs 
X N/A 
Use cover crops to avoid bare 
fallows 
X N/A Use slow release fertilizers X N/A 
Enhance plant and animal 
productivity and efficacy 
X N/A Apply N when crop uptake is 
guaranteed 
X N/A 
Adopt farming practices with 
reduced reliance on external 
inputs 
X N/A Place N into soil to enhance 
accessibility 
X N/A 
Livestock management, pasture and fodder supply 
improvement 
Avoid any surplus N application X N/A 
Reduce lifetime emissions X N/A Manage tillage and residues 
conservatively 
X N/A 
Breed dairy for lifetime 
efficiency 
X N/A Reduce unnecessary tillage using 
minimum and no-till strategies 
X N/A 
Breed and manage to increase 
productivity 
X N/A Maintaining fertile soils and restoring degraded land 
Plant deep-rooting species in 
primary production 
L CDM A/R, 
VCS, Plan 
Vivo 
Re-vegetate L CDM A/R, 
VCS, Plan 
Vivo 
Introduce legumes into 
grasslands  
L CDM A/R, 
VCS, Plan 
Vivo 
Improve fertility by nutrient 
amendment 
X N/A 
Prevent methane emissions 
from manure heaps and tanks 
E CDM, VCS, 
Gold 
Standard 
Apply substrates such as 
compost and manure 
X N/A 
Utilize biogas as a resource E CDM, VCS, 
Gold 
Standard 
Halt soil erosion and carbon 
mineralization by soil 
conservation techniques e.g. 
reduced tillage, contour 
X N/A 
 
 
3 Table adapted from Smith et al (2007) 
farming, strip cropping and 
terracing 
Compost manure E CDM, VCS, 
Gold 
Standard 
Retain crop residues as covers X N/A 
 Conserve water X N/A 
Sequester carbon by increasing 
soil organic matter content 
X N/A 
Legend 
X = Not yet possible to generate carbon credits 
L = Generates LU credits 
E = Generates energy credits 
Abbreviations 
 
CDM A/R: Clean Development Mechanism, Afforestation / Reforestation methodologies 
VCS: Verified Carbon Standard 
Note: The table only refers to standards applicable in developing countries. 
 
Additional barriers faced by LU projects (listed as “L” in Table 1) include: 
• Lumpy cash flows; carbon credits can typically only be sold after a minimum of five 
years of operation (and are generated only once every five years)4, whereas 
significant costs are incurred in this period. Credit volumes are relatively small in the 
first issuance periods. 
• Demand is primarily from VCMs, where prices and demand are more uncertain. 
• Engagement in a carbon credit project may reduce the already limited smallholders’ 
land management options, which may be a dis-incentive.  
 
 
4 An exception to this is the Plan Vivo standard, which does allow for significantly quicker crediting, but which suffers from relatively poor demand. More 
information on the Plan Vivo standard can be found at: www.planvivo.org and information on demand and prices can be found in: Hamilton, K., Peters-
Stanley, M., and Marcello, T. ‘Building Bridges: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2010,’ Ecosystem Marketplace, available from: http://forest-
trends.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=2433  
 Characteristics of smallholder agriculture finance in 
developing countries 
Many of the barriers to smallholder carbon credit mitigation projects are general issues 
associated with investing in smallholder agriculture, rather than carbon finance per se.  
Markets and investments domestically driven and focused 
Most agricultural investments in developing countries are funded domestically (Ritchie 2010). 
These sources of capital can be classified as informal (personal loans from family members or 
informal lenders) or formal. Formal sources include trade credit (e.g. seed and subsidy 
programs) and commercial lending by banks. Non-domestic sources include loans associated 
with international agriculture companies, banks, donors and NGOs.  
Formal financial agents can engage with smallholders in a variety of ways, broadly 
categorized into short and long term credit, provision of risk mitigation instruments, and 
equity. Table 2 summarizes formal financing types that are not associated with an aggregating 
institution, such as contract farming (including share cropping), or to production (trade 
credit). The cost of providing such capital varies depending on factors including duration and 
location. Monies can be distributed through a company, individual or cooperative.  
Various smallholder categories exist, and access to capital tends to reflect the smallholders’ 
producer category. It is also influenced by location and local infrastructure (physical, social, 
institutional). Smallholder production categories include production for: 
• Subsistence, as opposed to sale. 
• Sale in domestic markets as opposed to for export. 
• Export, as part of an aggregating institution, or on a more individual basis, for 
example, through a local trader.  
It may be easiest for smallholders producing for export, particularly those part of an 
aggregating institution, to access formal sources of capital. These may also be the most 
accessible, in terms of financing improvements to their management practices. It may be 
difficult to claim a premium for ‘climate-friendly’ agricultural products from smallholders 
who only supply their local markets, where customers typically are not in a position to pay a 
premium for ‘sustainable’ products.  
Table 2 General agricultural finance categories 
Financing type What is it? Example relevant to a 
smallholder 
Example of requirements to 
access, if available 
Short-term credit Loans with a 
maturity ≤ 12 
months  
Small loans to individual 
based on personal profile 
e.g. to purchase a cow 
Group backing / good 
personal reputation. May 
require collateral e.g. bicycle 
Long-term credit Loans with a 
maturity of > 12 
months  
Larger bank loans e.g. for 
machinery 
More sizeable collateral 
including future production, 
land. Bank account.  
Risk mitigation 
instruments 
Insurance products, 
savings 
Micro-insurance, weather-
based insurance 
Reliable local weather data, 
mobile phone 
Equity Ownership in a 
commercial company  
Equity in a producer 
organization 
Bank account, legally 
incorporated entity 
Investments reflect stakeholders’ risk and return profiles  
Investors pursue opportunities according to their specific goals. Investors pursuing riskier 
opportunities tend to require higher returns. Some investors may be subsidized by cheaper 
capital from multinational organizations, aid agencies or philanthropic sources. 
Geographically and sector diverse investors operate according to different social and 
environmental ideals. Investor interest is also heavily influenced by local government policies 
and practices, e.g. taxation, stability of rule of law, foreign exchange constraints. 
Risk and return characteristics also vary according to smallholder type. Smallholders that are 
highly reliant on the land for their livelihood may strongly favour short-term returns, i.e. they 
apply a high discount rate to evaluate any new activity. They may also engage in many 
different income-generating activities, on and off the land, to diversify their incomes and 
minimize risk. Risk related to uncertain land tenure and availability of land may increase 
smallholder preference for quicker returns, rather than returns associated with more 
sustainable, long-term LU practices.  
 ‘Sustainable agriculture’ investments5, that maintain long-term productivity, may require 
significant upfront costs, potentially accompanied by a reduction in short to medium-term 
income. For example, it may take many years before benefits of new tree crops are realized. 
However, such an investment, once made, may translate into a lessened likelihood of 
abandonment by the smallholder. In order to be successful, payments must help smallholders 
overcome initial upfront costs, and reduce the short to medium term penalties associated with 
implementing a longer-term improved land management practice.  
There may be additional risks associated with production for export 
Although farmers may receive higher prices for export crops, particularly for certified 
produce, risks may also increase. They may take on significant risk in committing to deliver a 
certain type and volume of produce, potentially diverting productive capacity away from 
directly feeding their family, and reducing income diversity (in terms of products and 
seasonality). By selling into markets with higher standards, they take on new and additional 
costs (and risk) associated with certification. This issue was encountered by DrumNet in 
Kenya, where a company buying produce from smallholders suddenly stopped doing so 
because of lack of compliance with new European import requirements. This forced producers 
to sell their product below expected price and they returned to their subsistence crops (Ashraf 
et al. 2010). 
Carbon credits could be considered a form of export produce, and existing risks could be 
lessened or exacerbated by carbon finance. Risks could be exacerbated if the benefit 
associated with mitigation is only provided to the smallholder after credits are issued and if 
the smallholder has to bear upfront costs associated with developing a carbon credit project. 
The effect on smallholders depends on the basis on which benefits associated with mitigation 
are issued, e.g. payments made for changing practices versus for the production of specific 
 
 
5 This paper defines ‘sustainable agriculture’ investment as investments in a ‘integrated system of plant and animal production practices having a site-
specific application that will, over the long term: satisfy human food and fibre needs; enhance environmental quality and the natural resource base upon 
which the agricultural economy depends; make the most efficient use of non-renewable resources and on-farm resources and integrate, where appropriate, 
natural biological cycles and controls; sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and enhance the quality of life for farmers and society as a whole.” 
US Congress ‘Farm Bill’ (Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (FACTA), Public Law 101-624, Title XVI, Subtitle A, Section 1603 
(Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1990) NAL Call # KF1692.A31 1990). 
carbon credit volumes. The form and timing of when carbon-related benefits are provided will 
influence smallholders’ appetite for engaging in mitigation activities.  
An example of how international commodity producers could facilitate mitigation is 
Cadburys, which is investigating if carbon credits could be used to help finance Ghanaian 
farmers in transitioning to shade grown, rather than un-shaded cocoa. However, this approach 
may be limited to a tree crops for which there is a robust market, and to companies that can 
afford the upfront cost of sustainability and that can pay for developing the carbon credit 
project. 
Overlaps between financing for agricultural products 
and mitigation 
Profitability of both agriculture and carbon credit projects is a factor of production volumes, 
expected product prices and the size and timing of production costs. While there is some 
difference between specific barriers associated with improved and increased investment in 
smallholder agriculture and carbon credit projects, significant overlap exists. Figure 1 
illustrates some of these overlaps. Selected the overlapping factors are described in the sub-
sections below.  
 
 Figure 1 Overlap of barriers to carbon and agricultural finance 
 
 
Ability to manage risks 
The ability to control risks helps to smooth income. Smallholders may be sensitive to 
agricultural risks due to lack of income or food source diversity. They face risks related to 
production (e.g. adverse weather, pests), overdependence on a few crops, price volatility and 
changes to regulatory frameworks – for both agricultural products and carbon credits. 
Weather-related risks are likely to increase as a result of climate change. 
Insurance and risk mitigation challenges are linked to infrastructure (e.g. weather stations), 
government policies and legislation (Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma 2010). Large agricultural 
companies and investors control financial risks through expert credit evaluation systems, 
portfolio diversification, managing exposure limits, provisioning and hedging. These are not 
available to the smallholder.  
Many smallholders rely on traditional coping methods and formal or semi-formal 
arrangements to manage financial risk e.g. social networks, informal loans, contract farming 
and sharing liability amongst a group. These methods are more limited in their ability to 
transfer and diversify risk and context sensitive. More formal risk mitigation methods e.g. 
insurance, tradable futures contracts6 and guarantees are less readily available in developing 
countries. Combining micro-insurance with access to credit has demonstrated some successes, 
however this form of risk mitigation is still relatively new (Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma 
2010).7,8 
Risk within a project should be transferred to the entity best able to control it. There are risks 
specifically associated with a carbon credit project (registration, monitoring, reporting and 
verification), in addition to the general implementation risks mentioned above. The project 
developer, rather than the smallholder, is best equipped to manage specific carbon credit 
project risks.  
Links to adaptation and resilience programs could also be explored. For example, a program 
to develop increased smallholder resilience could support a third party insurer to provide 
affordable insurance against non-controllable risk related to climate change. Access to low 
cost insurance could encourage the smallholder to invest in mitigation and at the same time 
increase their resilience to climate change, an example of this could be ENSO insurance 
offered in Peru (Skees and Collier 2010). 
 
 
 
6 Tradable futures contracts are standardized, transferable, exchange-traded contracts that require delivery of a commodity at a specified price, on an 
agreed future date. 
7 Micro-insurance is defined as ‘protection of low-income people against specific perils in exchange for a pre-specified payment determined in proportionate 
to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved and made in advance.’ Definition from a presentation entitled ‘Microinsurance markets: An Overview’, 
presented by N. A. Fernando, Principal Finance Specialist (Microfinance), Asian Development Bank, Regional Workshop on Microinsurance Sector 
Development, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 28-29 June 2007. Available at: www.adb.org/Documents/Slideshows/Microfinance/Microinsurance-Sri-Lanka-Mission.pdf 
8 For an example of a successful combined micro-insurance and credit scheme, see ‘Microinsurance Matters’ No. 9, ‘Dry Day Weather Index Insurance’ p. 
4. November 2010. Available at: www.microensure.com/images/library/files/Newsletters/microinsurance_matters_issue_9.pdf  
Box 1 The risk trap for subsistence smallholders (Doran et al. 2009) 
‘The cash-flow and risk-management needs of agriculture-dependent households prevent most smallholders 
from allocating capital sources towards more specialized and profitable production activities for market. 
Most rural households operate tiny land holdings (less than 2 Ha) for a range of subsistence production 
activities and they diversify their income sources across farm and non-farm economic activities. They tend 
to favor low-risk, low-return crops that do not require significant investment in inputs but are more robust 
even in unfavorable weather and soil conditions. For example, 1 Ha of maize, which requires several 
applications of (costly) fertilizer, can yield 3x as much as 1 Ha of millet or sorghum. A study in Kenya found 
that less than one-half of farmers who intended to invest in fertilizer actually did so even though fertilizer 
increases yield returns up to 36% over several months. For cash constrained households, the security of a 
sub-optimal supply of food is frequently the only rational option. This subsistence approach to farming 
minimizes demand for external capital and its potential returns.' 
 Access to inputs 
Access to credit and banking infrastructure can help smallholders reduce risk, manage cash 
flows and invest in increased productivity. Risk and credit issues are interlinked. Credit 
worthiness is, for example, evaluated on the basis of repayment capacity and assets 
(collateral).  Seeds, fertilizers and equipment also require either cash or forms of credit. Table 
3 describes some of the commercial credit sources – note that it excludes informal sources.  
Table 3 Overview of credit sources 
Provider Description Issues 
Local bank A bank with significant 
operations in the country. 
Many are not active in rural areas, e.g. local banks in sub-
Saharan Africa allocates on average less than 8% of their 
lending to agriculture.* Where such lending takes place it 
is typically targeted to high value export crops.** 
Agricultural bank Specialized bank lending 
money to farmers, 
typically over long time 
periods and at low 
interest rates. May be 
government subsidized. 
Few successful agricultural banks exist and many are 
Government controlled. They may only invest in projects 
of a certain size or producing a particular product – this 
may exclude smallholders. 
Microfinance 
Institution (MFI) 
Organization providing 
small, short-term loans to 
individuals. 
Have traditionally not been active in rural areas as they 
thrive on attaining a certain scale. Lending is typically to 
an individual, rather than for specific production 
outcomes. 
Public sector 
credit (local 
Government) 
Credit, and other 
resources such as seeds 
are provided below 
market rates by the 
government. 
This is hostage to government policies and management 
infrastructure. Long term sustainability may be an issue. 
Rural financial 
cooperatives 
This can refer to several 
models, including Village 
Savings and Loans 
Associations (VSLA) and 
Self Help Groups. 
Success depends on interest rates charged, to whom loans 
are provided and on what terms and how funds are 
distributed. A poorly diversified customer base may 
increase risk, governance and management may be poor 
and the facility vulnerable to liquidity shortages. 
Trade credit 
(from company 
purchasing 
products) 
Financing based on the 
product value chain, for 
example a processing 
company lending to a 
producer and recouping 
the loan upon product 
delivery. 
Limited flexibility and funds are tied to the product, this 
may be open to misuse by the credit provider.  
Socially 
Responsible 
Investor (SRI) 
Investors seeking social 
and environmental 
outcomes as well as 
These investors typically require a minimum return 
(although this may be lower than normal investors). They 
require a minimum deal size and tend to invest in the 
financial returns. generation of a specific product. Investment that is 
subsidized may not be sustainable. 
Carbon financier Investment is based on 
expected carbon credit 
revenues. 
Requires a minimum scale, for example in terms of number 
of participating households and tons of carbon mitigated. 
Carbon financiers are also influenced by fund life and the 
timing of market demand, e.g. associated with length of a 
commitment period. 
* Doran et al. 2009 
** Ritchie 2010 
 
Various actors have a role to play in improving access to both agricultural and financial 
inputs. Fertilizer companies are, for example, repackaging products to make them more 
accessible to smallholders. Mobile telephone banking is helping smallholders to access micro-
insurance. Aggregation is important in improving access, e.g. by making leasing of farm tools 
to make them more affordable and by pooling collateral necessary to purchase infrastructure. 
Government policies could help improve access to inputs, including credit, e.g. by developing 
credit bureaus and property registries, information technology infrastructure to support 
monitoring and gather weather data, financial education and development of risk transfer 
mechanisms and guarantees. Mainstreaming recognition of other sources of collateral, 
including warehouse receipts, accounts receivable, equipment, standing crops and livestock 
are also necessary. Carbon credit purchase contracts could, for example, be a form of 
collateral.  
Aggregation  
Aggregation, for example through farmer cooperatives, can improve access to resources 
including credit and risk mitigation products and can increase bargaining power. Investors for 
both carbon credits and agricultural products require a minimum scale of operation to justify 
time, effort and costs associated with making an investment. 
Commercially viable models do exist for engaging smallholders, but require aggregation to 
help reduce barriers to inputs (credit, fertilizer, seeds etc.), access markets and infrastructure. 
Group members can, for example, guarantee each others’ loans, and group purchase 
agreements with buyers can help increase access to seeds and fertilizer.  
The Chiansi irrigation project in Zambia developed by InfraCo (Palmer et al. 2010) provides 
an example of how benefits can be increased through aggregation. ‘Patient capital’ and an 
 appropriate benefit-sharing model were used to overcome investment barriers, including high 
up-front costs, long payback periods and a perception of high risk by investors. This concept 
of developing appropriate local benefit sharing models with ‘patient capital’, ‘…’long-term, 
subordinated capital invested at sub-commercial cost, which is used to fund the one-off start-
up costs and part of the cost of the very long-life assets’ (Palmer et al. 2010) could be an 
interesting model to examine to in the context of mitigation. 
Business models to engage smallholders through different aggregation models are 
summarized in Table 4 (Cotula and Vermeulen 2010). Many variations of these models exist. 
Note that the terms ‘out-grower scheme’ and ‘contract farming’ are used interchangeably and 
describe a situation where a smallholder has a contractual relationship with a purchaser of 
agricultural goods.   The smallholder is paid for production and may as part of the deal get 
access to production-increasing goods and services including improved seed varieties, credit 
or storage facilities.  
Table 4 Overview of aggregation models 
Model Sub-model Description 
Driven by smallholders 
Cooperatives and 
farmer controlled 
institutions 
Associations, trusts, 
enterprises, cooperatives, 
farmer owned companies 
Formalized groups of smallholders that have legal 
standing. Many different structures exist depending 
on the institutions purpose, e.g. marketing agency 
vs. producers cooperative. 
Contract farming N/A Smallholders group together to lease land to a third 
party, for example to a commercial farm manager. 
Driven by third-party such as an agribusiness company or exporter 
Contract farming High centralized Institution that buys from a large number of 
smallholders and imposes demands on produce 
quantity and quality 
Nucleus estate Institution that buys through a centralized model, 
combined with a nucleus estate managed by the 
institution. 
Multipartite Joint venture (JV) between a third party and a local 
entity representing smallholders and in contractual 
relationships with them. 
Informal Verbal purchase agreements, usually completed on 
a seasonal basis. 
Intermediary Institution that has a contract with an intermediary 
who signs up individual smallholders. 
Tenant farming or 
share cropping 
N/A Contracting of smallholders to manage land owned 
or leased by a third party.  
 
Formal credit attached to the supply chain, through one of the aggregation models described 
in Table 4, has been the dominant source of working capital for smallholders (Doran et al. 
2009). However, the reach of formal credit to smallholders has been hampered by lack of 
organization, transparent pricing and fragmentation (van Empel 2010).  
Despite their diversity, aggregation models have some common ingredients for long-term 
success, including:  
• Clear participation criteria for the farmers e.g. minimum landholding size, 
demonstration of sufficient entrepreneurial spirit or engagement, basic understanding 
of business planning and farm management skills; 
• Transparent terms of reference for the product, e.g. describing quality requirements, 
pricing arrangements and services provided such as input, credit and extension 
services; 
• Trust between parties in the model, for example established in agreed codes of 
conduct; 
• Registration and record keeping. 
Best practices and capacity 
Many smallholders lack access to extension services that could help them improve yields 
without increasing costs. Such services may be paid for by the farmer (privately), an NGO or 
the government or provided by the aggregating entity. NGOs such as Land O’Lakes have 
been instrumental in providing extension services but the sustainability of this provision may 
be an issue. Information technology may help to overcome some of these barriers, e.g. by 
providing advice via text messages. It is likely that both carbon credit project developers and 
agricultural investors will have to invest in improved extension services to train smallholders. 
Tenure, property rights and enforcement 
Tenure and property rights are often unclear – in the context of agricultural production and 
carbon credits. Various access and user rights may be attached to the land, these may be 
 allocated to parties other than the landowner. Improper consideration of tenure issues may 
exacerbate inequality within the community and lead to conflict, compromising investment 
returns. Differences in rights to below and above ground carbon can also be unclear. 
Enforcement of rights including proper arbitration processes for dispute resolution processes 
(DRPs) may also be lacking. DRPs must be transparent, accessible and must not be too 
lengthy in order to encourage investment. For example, Indonesia is considering establishing 
‘Green Benches’ to tackle disputes arising as a result of carbon-related investments. 
  
Conclusions 
Existing carbon finance approaches, with their complex procedures, unpredictable and often 
long payback periods are exacerbated by existing agricultural finance barriers. Financing 
barriers faced by smallholders are more fundamental to address than barriers specifically 
related to carbon credit development. If designed correctly, carbon finance could reduce some 
of these hurdles by providing revenue diversification tied to sustainable practices and by 
encouraging aggregation which could increase the accessibility of services and products. The 
forms of carbon finance which will be most appropriate to smallholders will likely be those 
which particularly target improving their long- term productivity while at the same time 
increasing mitigation (and resilience).  
Agricultural mitigation finance could result in win-win situations for smallholders. However, 
the profitability of pure agricultural carbon projects involving smallholders is often too low to 
be of interest. It may therefore be necessary to design carbon finance in such a way that it 
helps to bridge the gap until the project becomes economical.  
Recommendations to various groups for developing win-win approaches that address 
smallholder financing (and carbon finance) barriers are given below: 
Governments, multilaterals and donor agencies 
• Develop sectoral approaches e.g. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Activities 
(NAMAs) encouraging smallholders to adopt improved practices by providing trade 
credit and adopting legislation requiring banks to lend to Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) that promote climate friendly agriculture, subsidizing 
certification; 
• Support infrastructure development that improves smallholders’ access to financial 
inputs (e.g. credit bureaus, weather stations); 
• Support controlled productivity gains e.g. access to input through broad co-
investment subsidies; 
• Evaluate government policies e.g. taxation to encourage increased investment in 
improved smallholder agriculture; 
 • Re-examine trade rules that act as barriers to agricultural producers in developing 
countries and ‘climate friendly’ labelling; 
• Develop private public partnerships catalyzing improved investment in agriculture 
such e.g. leveraging ‘patient capital’ and credit guarantee facilities. An example of 
this is the US$10m guarantee facilities developed by AGRA and its partners; 
• Support pilots that promote improved agricultural practices. 
Companies, including investors and banks 
• Test the application of carbon as an additional revenue stream in existing smallholder 
production systems; 
• Develop new products that can be used by smallholders to overcome barriers, e.g. M-
PESA, the Kenyan mobile payment system; 
• Test the use of new forms of collateral e.g. carbon credit purchase contracts; 
• Help leverage and invest ‘patient capital’.  
NGO and research organizations 
• Explore opportunities for adding a mitigation element to existing private and public 
extensions services (e.g. piggybacking on PepsiCo’s Indian distribution system); 
• Develop and test instruments to help farmers overcome barriers, e.g. risk mitigation 
instruments, securitization of future carbon revenues; 
• Facilitate aggregation, e.g. support the building of farmers’ organizations, act as a 
trusted intermediary. 
The barriers that must be overcome are fundamental to the livelihoods of many, and go far 
beyond carbon finance issues, although significant overlap is acknowledged. By tackling 
these barriers, it may be possible to unlock some of the potential mitigation from agriculture. 
Vice-versa, ‘fit-for-purpose’ carbon finance for mitigation could help to overcome some 
existing barriers faced by smallholders. In designing fit-for-purpose carbon finance, emphasis 
must be on overcoming these fundamental, traditional barriers faced by smallholders and to 
financing sustainable agriculture in general, rather than on generating discrete units of 
mitigation.  
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